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(e.g., Yukl, 2002, p. 2) pertaining to IS, but they tend to
be cross-sectional and quantitative (Karyda et al., 2005) and
rarely examine the actual mechanisms that explain the importance of management and leadership (there are exceptions, e.g.,
Siponen, 2000). As the literature on information and communications technology (ICT) and information security management
(ISM) increasingly brings out, much of the early area research
has focused on technical issues and solutions, to the relative detriment of the “human” side of ISM—that is, attitudes,
beliefs, norms, behavioral patterns, leadership, culture, resistance etc. (e.g., Albrechtsen, 2007; Bock et al., 2005; Dhillon &
Backhouse, 2001; Karyda et al., 2005; Rivard & Lapoint, 2010;
Siponen, 2000; Siponen & Oinas-Kukkonen, 2007). It has also
been suggested that one of the most important success factors
when working with information security is employee awareness
of the problem (e.g., Tsohou et al., 2008). The notion of awareness is one example how social and psychological processes
have gradually entered the fields of IS and ISM. Sometimes
this theme is complemented by one where the role of managers swings into focus—how their actions influence awareness
and implementation of ISM (e.g., Karyda et al., 2005; Reddick,
2009). There are rather fewer examples of either theoretical or
empirical contributions that deal with mechanisms pertaining to
the intersection between those in formal management positions
and other employees.
The purpose of this study is to identify and analyze mechanisms by which managers may help or hinder successful ISM in
an organization. To this end, we design and apply an analytical
framework consisting of three “tracks” that home in on different mechanisms that influence ISM activities. The framework
is based on an understanding of IS and ISM that emphasizes
the importance of learning in a social context and where qualities like information security awareness (ISA), “[which] aims
at attracting the attention of all IS users to the security message,
making them understand the importance of information security and their security obligations” (Tsohou et al., 2008, p. 210),
active participation (rather than mechanical compliance; as conceptualized by Neal et al., 2000), and mindfulness rather than

The authors argue that information security management
(ISM) would benefit from studies that examine the social and psychological mechanisms that, when in evidence, generate employee
awareness of information security (IS)-related issues. Properly
instilled, IS awareness has the power to engender a proactive wariness beyond mechanical guidelines, however detailed. To study
how awareness travels in complex organizations, the authors devise
a framework to catch mechanisms grounded in psychological and
sociological theories. To illustrate the framework, the authors
then turn to an empirical study of a medium-sized company
where they sound out managers for definitions of IS and ISM;
for initiatives intended to influence IS and IS awareness among
employees; and for their views on learning related to IS and ISM.
The study highlights the difficulties facing managers charged with
IS matters, whose responsibilities are often considered peripheral by the general employee. The study also provides several
pointers on how to go about the complex business of building
awareness. Organization Management Journal, 9: 64–77, 2012. doi:
10.1080/15416518.2012.666952
Keywords information security management; information security;
IS; ISM; awareness; leadership

THE SOFT SIDE OF INFORMATION SECURITY
MANAGEMENT
In a worldwide survey among information security (IS) professionals, senior management support was identified as the
highest ranking information security issue (Knapp et al., 2006).
Attempts to identify the exact nature of such support/leadership
are still rather thin on the ground, however. A wealth of studies emphasize the role of management support and leadership
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mindlessness (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001, p. 42) are perceived as
critical for the long-term viability of IS.
Unlike other ISM studies (e.g., Karyda et al., 2005), we
wish specifically to focus on the default ISM situation in an
organization, that is, one devoid of recent or imminent ISM
initiatives or drives, and where IS is but one of a number of
managerial concerns. How IS fares in the day-to-day management business will, we argue, both have a pivotal impact on
actual IS in the organization and, as we show, provide muchneeded input when planning initiatives and drives to improve it.
With this in mind we finally put our nascent framework to
the test and demonstrate how it can be used to anchor an interview study with a group of senior managers in a medium-sized
utility company. The focus of the empirical study is how these
managers may help and hinder awareness of information security issues in the normal run of things—that is, we repeat, when
no major IS initiatives are in the offing.
MANAGING AWARENESS TO MANAGE INFORMATION
SECURITY: THREE REASONS TO UNDERTAKE THIS
STUDY
Reason 1: The General Importance of Awareness
Processes
A guiding assumption in this effort is that the benefits
of IS awareness, participation, and mindfulness—and thus of
managerial policies that raise them—can be traced to the flexibility these qualities bring. A baseline level of judicious independence in the way employees relate to IS in the organization
can prove an attractive complement to detailed lists of dos-anddon’ts. Awareness, participation, and mindfulness essentially
improve the chances that individuals will act responsibly even
in situations where there is little or no formal guidance. They
additionally provide a living context for issued IS instructions. As Siponen (2000, p. 31) puts it, “Information security
awareness is of crucial importance, as information security techniques or procedures can be misused, misinterpreted or not used
by end-users, thereby losing their real usefulness.” Siponen
focuses on the information security sector, but his remarks are
just as valid elsewhere.
Reason 2: New Organizational Forms Accentuate
the Need to Coach Employee Awareness
The various ways that management can bolster awareness
and use it as a complementing vehicle for policy implementation are likely to become more important as organizations
increasingly contain post-bureaucratic elements. Simply put,
the network organization (e.g., Kenney & Florida, 1993; Ferlie
et al., 1996; Powell, 1990) is an ideal inexorably on the rise.
In the resulting, less tightly coupled organizational forms, associates become more nomadic, move in and out of projects, take
on the guise of roving agents, belong to many different organizations at the same time, and so on. To maintain control at all in

65

such a complex environment is a growing challenge facing managers, and strict information-mapping-plus-audit models are no
panaceas, as studies of, for instance, accidents resulting from
complex system breakdowns have shown (e.g., Rasmussen,
1997; Snook, 2000). Implanting or heightening psychosocial
qualities such as awareness, participation, and mindfulness is
one way to improve the chances that even semi-autonomous
agents will act in ways that turn out to be beneficial to the wider
organization.
Traditional models have typically promoted and/or made use
of technology and formal administrative management tools, but
increasing boundary-crossing, even nomadic, behavior patterns
require a complementing approach to (information and other)
security that is anchored in the ways individuals relate to each
other.
Sociocognitive behavior theorists (e.g., Bandura, 1997) have
confirmed that the individual’s ability to motivate and regulate him- or herself becomes increasingly important in loosely
coupled organizations. The psychology of leadership and management becomes a key consideration when we try to fashion
methods to prepare and package information in ways that,
ideally, maximize its perceived genuine relevance to targeted
individuals and stimulate acceptable self-motivated IS behavior.

Reason 3: The Peripheral Status of IS Makes It Particularly
Awkward to Manage
Unless the organization has security as its specific raison
d’être, information security is, at best, a fringe interest to most
managers and employees in it (e.g., McFadzean et al., 2007).
Most employees would presumably agree, in principle, that
defenses that keep the wheels moving by safeguarding information and/or help avert some nebulous disaster down the line
are useful. At the same time, actual IS measures tend to intrude
on work tasks that the individual employee considers primary.
Employees may thus be tempted to circumvent them in order
to carry out their primary work tasks more efficiently. This is a
good illustration of the potential benefits of enhancing IS awareness. New and stricter guidelines will not necessarily weed
out indifference or even hostility to IS measures. True awareness, by definition, will. Detailed dos-and-don’ts will not cover
unforeseen exigencies. True awareness may.

The Challenge of Information Security Management
The chief information officer (CIO; we here use the title to
indicate a manager responsible for IS matters) is thus faced with
a particularly devious management task: to somehow overcome
the intrinsic indifference or hostility to IS and induce users to
embrace necessary measures as integral aspects of work.

Structure of the Rest of This Article
Figure 1 outlines the structure of the rest of the article.
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can really be understood as interlinked aspects of a recurring
social learning cycle (we build on Boisot, 1998). While such a
perspective for the most part calls for a bird’s-eye (macro) view
on the “architecture” of grand-scale organizational learning processes, it remains firmly rooted in micro-level sociocognitive
theories on interaction and behavior. Between these extremes
we find a meso level where learning processes within individual organizations are the major concern. Improved grasp of the
learning processes that belong to any of the three levels will
improve management ability to gauge, and possibly manage,
how organizational members perceive, think, and behave vis-àvis IS. We suggest that the ancillary status of IS policies in most
organizations and the changing nature of organizations themselves make it particularly important to consider all three levels
simultaneously. The framework thus comprises the following
three tracks: a micro track (focusing on cognition and behavior);
a meso track (representations of knowledge in social systems);
and a macro track (systems design; Table 1). To each track we
affix a number of theories, and furnish brief explanations or elucidations when we feel that the context does not provide enough
intuitive pointers.

FIG. 1.

The study at a glance.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEADERSHIP
AND INFORMATION SECURITY MANAGEMENT
While our focus remains intimately linked to leadership, we
adopt a broader approach than is perhaps common in leadership
studies. Yukl (2009) points out that the study of leaders’ influence on learning processes in teams and organizations cannot
be confined to mechanisms of person-to-person influence but
has to identify and include other mechanisms as well. Heeding
Yukl’s suggestion, we thus prepare to outline a three-track analytical framework that is intended to catch theoretical input we
feel may be fruitful, given our current focus. We emphasize that
included theories are not exclusively focused on aspects of leadership, but have a considerably wider and more generic scope
(covering, among other things, mechanisms relating to systems,
representations of knowledge, learning processes, and individual cognition and behavior). In each case it will be possible to
apply a leadership perspective, however. The idea, put bluntly,
is to not be hemmed in by predefined notions of how leadership
should be studied, but to remain open to a range of candidates.
This is also the reason why we have decided to develop a multitrack framework (rather than a more open-ended counterpart):
We feel that its very structure will force us to consider a wider
range of potential mechanisms and supporting theories when
studying how leadership matters in relation to the management
of IS. The tracks should thus not be viewed as strictly discrete; they are complementary pointers, and overlaps should be
expected.
We have suggested elsewhere (Sundström & Holmberg,
2008) that awareness-making and employee ability/willingness
to integrate IS aspects and policies in everyday work activities

APPROACHING LEADERSHIP AND INFORMATION
SECURITY MANAGEMENT: THREE THEORETICAL
TRACKS
Changes in the organization of work have brought to the
fore the growing importance of the ability to reflect about
one’s actions and learning as evidenced by the burgeoning
literature on (generic) learning, organizational learning, and
knowledge (Argyris & Schön, 1996; Boisot, 1998; Boisot &
Li, 2007; Lipshitz, Popper, & Friedman, 2002; March, 1991;
Nonaka, 1991). The increasing complexity of production processes and rapid technological development have prompted the
development of theoretical models that aim to improve our
general understanding of complex system-level dynamics (e.g.,
Perrow, 1984; Rasmussen, 1997). There are also examples of
more narrowly focused models dealing with failures (and how
to understand failures) in complex systems, for example, the
theory of practical drift, where Snook (2001) notes that the
unconscious evolving of practice may well improve on formal
protocol in most cases (which is why it occurs at all), but also
disregards specific but highly unusual exigencies. Snook also
notes that when protocol aberrations were observed, solutions
tended to revolve around a hardening of protocol where more
detailed rules were issued to weed out the problems. As the
dynamics that led to the continual reinterpretation of protocol were left untouched, this approach was unable to “enforce”
the sought-after compliance, however. New instructions were in
effect fed into the same machinery that had processed the old
instructions, and results were similar. We find Snook’s studied
case particularly relevant because information security management is to ward against exigencies so rare that they will
hardly rouse or even rattle the average employee in a typical
organization. Practical drift helps explain the natural process
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TABLE 1
Three tracks at a glance
Level/track

Focus, mechanisms,
mediums

Actions/behaviors related
to leadership

Micro: cognitive, Individual’s goals,
behavioral
self-regulation, skills,
feedback, direct interaction

Communicating standards, norms, goals,
and values; providing feedback; acting
as a model to enhance self-efficacy;
coaching leadership qualities; etc.

Meso: learning
and knowledge

Representations of
knowledge; social systems
(i.e., groups, teams,
communities of practice,
departments); social
structures

Macro: systems
design

System-wide design and
strategy; reflections about
institutions; understanding
representations of feedback
mechanisms;
organization-wide strategy

Facilitating learning; knowledge creation;
knowledge sharing; acting as a model in
dealing with defensive routines;
intellectual stimulation; base decisions
on valid data; using boundary objects.
Measurement systems, performance
indicators, evaluations, etc.
Representing, reflecting on, evaluating
and (re)designing systemic features;
shaping feedback processes and
impulses in the wider system; carefully
designing boundary objects (strategies,
policies, plans rules, performance
indicators); etc.

of “wariness atrophy” in these situations—and we argue that
awareness needs to be taken into account if IS managers truly
wish to offset these naturally occurring and debilitating forces.
These studies all underscore an important fact: Work in
large contemporary organizations is typically so knowledgeintensive that it must be mediated and managed by means of
various abstract representations such as plans, project management tools, accounting systems, performance indicators, and
so on. In such an environment, skilled leadership has a lot
to do with the ability smoothly to negotiate and manipulate
these knowledge maps (which are in effect simplified real-world
proxies). Since these abstractions in turn have concrete bearing
on the interaction between organizational entities, on organizational and social processes, and on the perceived context of
individual employees, they can help us identify mechanisms
through which leadership action truly impacts IS. Bluntly put,
certain forms of manipulation of these abstractions will indeed
organize and package information in ways that make it travel
well, and trigger the “self-motivated IS behavior” we discussed
earlier, while other forms of manipulation of the abstractions
will in effect constitute (IS) management duds.

The Micro Level: Influencing People Through
Interaction—A Cognitive Behavioral Track
A critical aspect of leadership involves “direct” influence
(e.g., Yukl, 2002). Tactics such as rational persuasion, consultation, personal appeals, and pressure may be used to achieve

Relevant psychological and
sociological theories
Bandura (1997)
Ajzen (2005)
Latham and Locke (1991)
Ilgen and Davis (2002)
Kluger and DeNisi (1996)
Hannah and Lester (2009)
Argyris and Schön (1996)
Nonaka (1991)
Boisot (1998)
Lave and Wenger (1991)
Lipshitz, Popper, and Friedman
(2002)
Rasmussen (1997)
Snook (2000)

this end. In a study of how CIOs influenced management peers,
Enns et al. (2003) found that rational persuasion and personal
appeals were correlated with commitment from other managers, whereas pressure and exchange were correlated with
resistance. It would seem pertinent to take a more detailed
look at the mechanisms that manage to engender commitment, so we turn to theories of social psychology and social
cognition.
One way of studying how leaders influence subordinates and
peers is to analyze their impact on attitudes, perceptions of
norms, and behavioral intentions (Ajzen, 2005), and how influence attempts affect individuals’ goals, self-efficacy, and other
self-regulatory processes (Bandura, 1997). Hannah and Lester
(2009) suggest that in order to encourage organizational learning, managers have to lead the way on a micro level, using direct
interaction with their coworkers to nurture nascent “developmental readiness” (p. 37). It becomes a matter of promoting
a general openness to learning, and helping coworkers realize
their capacity for critical thinking. An improved ability to monitor and evaluate their own thinking processes will, in short,
prepare them for further development and enable them to act
as “knowledge catalysts” in Hannah and Lester’s (2009) terminology. Latham and Locke (1991) underscore the importance
of goal-setting for individual performance and argue that goals
help the individual to direct his or her attention on to specific
aspects of the environment, making him or her better able to
extract relevant information to evaluate performance. Goals also
have a critical impact on self-regulation in that they help to
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focus efforts, and thus boost intensity and strengthen tenacity
(Hannah & Lester, 2009).
External feedback does not in and of itself necessarily lead to
changes in behavior or improved performance (Kluger & DeNisi,
1996). This is an important point, and one often overlooked in
audit-based organizational cultures. Instead, improved performance depends on how the individual evaluates the outcome
of his or her actions; on to what extent he or she is dissatisfied
with that outcome; and on whether he or she has a high level
of self-efficacy and set goals for improvement. Feedback can
indeed support such processes, but can also inhibit them. The
crucial role of self-efficacy beliefs (“people’s judgments of their
capabilities to organize and execute courses of action required
to attain designated types of performances”; Bandura, 1997,
p. 391) has been highlighted in a range of studies. Ilgen and
Davies (2002) analyze how people deal with negative feedback,
and discuss how leaders may help coach the individual’s goal
attainment strategies and self-regulation processes.
The communication of goals, standards, and norms thus has
an important role in shaping the individual’s efforts. Thoughtful
feedback, active involvement in self-regulation, strategy development, and the strengthening of self-efficacy beliefs are examples of how leaders can guide organizational members on a
micro level—mostly relying on direct interaction. Benefits will
be evident when a leader helps to direct coworkers toward clear,
challenging (yet realistic), and measurable goals and in the
process acts as a role model and facilitator to fortify coworkers’ self-efficacy (Bandura, 1997; Latham & Locke, 1991).
Ajzen’s (2005) theory of planned behavior offers another way
to understand the mechanisms involved when leaders influence organizational members on the micro level. According
to Ajzen, behavioral intentions are determined by (a) attitudinal beliefs (e.g., a belief that regularly changing passwords
will indeed raise the level of information security and that this
is in fact important for operations etc.), (b) normative influence (the degree to which significant others are perceived to
want me to change password regularly), and finally (c) behavioral control (do I think that I have control over the behaviors
needed to be able to change passwords?). Behavioral control
is of course closely related to competence and self-efficacy
beliefs. According to this theory, leaders who want to influence
their coworkers’ behavior should pay attention to their attitudes,
norms, and perceptions of behavioral control, and consequently
adapt their own behavior in ways that will have the most impact.

The Meso Level: Influencing People Through Boundary
Objects—A Learning and Knowledge-Centric Track
The meso level includes and relates to representations of
knowledge, and how these are related to effective action and
learning processes—usually within a social context.
A crucial element in any discussion about knowledge is the
realization that there are several different types of knowledge—
for example, the distinction between declarative knowledge

(knowing that X is so) and procedural knowledge (knowing
how something is accomplished). Based on philosophical works
on knowledge (e.g., Polanyi, 1958), management scholars have
drawn attention to the importance of tacit knowledge, arguing
that “creation of knowledge” in organizations can in reality be
viewed as transformation processes between tacit and explicit
knowledge and vice versa (Nonaka, 1991). Argyris and Schön
(1996) make a distinction between the explicit reasons we
give for our actions and the more implicit models that can
be induced from our actions. Boisot (1998) goes further and
suggests that knowledge can be fruitfully conceptualized as
varying in codification, abstraction, and diffusion, resulting in
different knowledge regimes ranging from embodied (mostly
tacit) knowledge via narrative knowledge to abstract symbolic
(mostly explicit) knowledge. Lave and Wenger (1991) highlight
how knowledge can be regarded as situated and thus understood
as an aspect of a practice embedded in everyday work. Another
theme in the meso-level literature concerns representations of
knowledge in the form of mental representations, theories, rules,
maps, databases, stories, routines, and so on.
Social and cultural contexts also have important repercussions on knowledge and learning processes. Boisot
(1998) discusses how (archetypal) bureaucracies, fiefs, clans,
and markets impact knowledge and knowledge creation in
specific and distinct ways, while practice-oriented researchers
like Lave and Wenger (1991) focus on concepts like communities of practice—contextual binders that cut across organizational charts to focus on actual interaction patterns.
A specific and intriguing angle on social and cultural aspects
and how they influence learning processes has been presented
by Argyris and Schöns (1996) in their study of defensive reasoning and routines appearing within organizations. Lipshitz et al.
(2002) have developed a model where organizational learning
mechanisms (practices such as debriefing after action) in conjunction with organizational values that support learning are
identified as fundamental for productive learning.
However conceptualized, these efforts—unlike those residing on the micro level—all attempt to frame the processual,
even cyclical, nature of learning in and by organizations. It is
relatively easy to connect these conceptualizations to the focus
on abstractions we have discussed already; it then becomes
a matter of somehow wedging in the abstracted knowledge
repositories in the information models.

The Macro Level: Influencing People Through System
Design—A System Architecture Track
The systems framework may be seen as even more farreaching in that it concerns representations of the many levels
(of the totality of a system) that surrounds a task or a role and
the focus is on the systemic mechanisms generating behavior.
Rasmussen (1997) provides a macro perspective when he
draws attention to system mechanisms that generate certain
types of behavior. While his focus is trained on the analysis
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of accidents, the suggested perspective may also be applied to
organizations and organizational roles in general. Rasmussen
suggests that the actor—the occupant of a specific role—is situated in a “space of possibilities” within which the actor retains
a certain liberty of action. Specific mechanisms in the systems
(typically external pressure to increase efficiency or an internally derived drive to minimize personal effort) tend to push
the role-occupant toward the boundaries of that space—and
sometimes stretch them in ways that can lead to accidents or
other undesired results. Rasmussen describes this process as a
structural migration toward boundaries and argues that attempts
to enforce stricter controls or to fight deviation head-on are
not viable long-term solutions. Rather, efforts should be made
to make “the boundaries explicit and known and [to provide]
opportunities to develop coping skills at boundaries” (p. 191).
Snook’s (2000) concept of practical drift shares many attributes
with the Rasmussen framework in that it identifies normal organizational processes where action-based logics and rule-based
logics clash and can lead to fatal accidents, even while individuals all act in good faith (Lundestad & Hommels, 2006; Snook,
2000). For us, Snook’s conceptualization holds extra allure as
he explicitly identifies the interface between tightly and loosely
coupled systems as the source of many problems. If, as we have
argued, nomadic work practices become gradually more prevalent, the number of such interfaces will inevitably multiply,
which will in turn aggravate structural problems.

ACROSS THE TRACKS: INSIGHTS
As we have indicated, the three tracks are not discrete—and
were never meant to be. If anything, existing overlaps are illuminating. For one thing, theories across the spectrum tend to
emphasize the role of the individual in organizations. There
appears to be general agreement that it is unwise to consider
the individual as a passive rule-follower or conduit of someone
else’s will. “Rules,” like set tasks, can be, and will be, subject to constant review by the individual, and will be adjusted
when interaction with the physical and social environment so
demands. This is bad news for prevalent audit-and-certify control models, as there cannot, by definition, be a “perfect” way
of doing things no matter how ardently you try to model ideal
information flows. An individual’s behavior in an organization can be perceived as a holding pattern on which a number
of forces—micro, meso, and macro—are constantly at work.
Here we get the theoretical framing of the increased problem
of managing loosely coupled organizations including nomadic
elements: More but weaker forces affect organizational holding
patterns, which in turn expands individuals’ “space of possibilities,” and with it the contextually determined freedom to
interpret management demands.
We similarly get a theoretically grounded understanding of
the particular challenges facing information security managers.
Managerial governance of aspects central to what the organization “is about” tends to be heeded more than managerial governance of (perceived) nonessential aspects (such as information
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security) because many different kinds of forces push roughly in
the same direction. When managers feed such “essential” information into the abstract representations we have already discussed (plans, project management tools, accounting systems,
performance indicators, etc.), they essentially feed expectations
into a system that is—on all levels—already primed to relate to
them.
The tracks also furnish some ideas how to overcome these
obstacles. Managers may, for instance, gather data on how
different pressures in the wider system actually affect the workers’ psychosocial context. Dialogue and reflection with such a
focus—which is typically beyond the managerial beaten track—
will create a more robust understanding of the factors that,
left unchecked, risk engendering undesired practical drift and
migration toward boundaries. Sharing such understanding in
an organization may be a step toward greater awareness, and
awareness is a first step on the winding road to active interest, and, ideally, the perceptional shift of “nonessential” aspects
(e.g., ISM) to the point where they are truly regarded as natural aspects of the organizational raison d’être (whereupon the
self-regulating forces will come into play).
The development of shared understanding/mental models
among employees, and especially within groups of managers
charged with managing and leading ISM in the organization,
is a critical component in developing awareness. Examples of
mechanisms that can contribute to this include the support of
connectivity and communality through interorganizational communication and information systems as described by Monge
et al. (1998). Their approach shows how a shared information infrastructure (such as, say, a busily used intranet or
shared database) is not “just” a beneficial information exchange
mechanism and connectivity medium. It also has a communal impact, as it creates a common frame of understanding of
related problems. This can make it easier to approach common challenges, including IS ones, as well as improve learning
opportunities across the organization. By extension, then, the
design and implementation of such connectivity platforms carry
with them a usually overlooked information-handling element
that a knowledgeable management can turn into a strategic
information management asset.
To further aid this transformation, the next step would
be to consider different design options based on the evolving understanding of the meso (learning/knowledge) track.
Facilitating learning processes by means of mechanisms like
audits, evaluations, and debriefings, where managers themselves (acting as role models) are subjected to frank and open
enquiry and criticism will encourage employees openly to discuss wider implications of policy changes (Argyris & Schön,
1996; Lipshitz, Popper & Friedman, 2002). Misfortunes and
acknowledgment of managerial fallibility carry with them a
great and often untapped learning potential in the wider organization. Micro-level insights finally provide hints how managers
may communicate clear goals and standards, provide feedback,
and in some cases coach employees in the way to manage
themselves in relation to, in this case, information security.
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FROM THEORY TO EMPIRICAL STUDY AND BACK
The Empirical Case Study—An Introduction
We have studied a medium-sized utility company in northern
Europe with around 500 employees dispersed across a relatively
wide geographic area and a number of different sites. The enterprise is organized as a concern with a number of subsidiary
companies.
We conducted interviews with eight managerial-level informants in the company: the CEO, the sales manager, the information technology (IT) manager (formally in charge of IS matters),
the human resources (HR) manager, the information manager,
two executives from subsidiary companies, and the company’s
security coordinator. All interviewees are well educated, are
experienced managers in the company (having had a number of
roles in the case company and its subsidiaries), and have been
involved in a major effort to reorganize the business. We refrain
from providing still more complete demographic data as the
information provided in the article combined with such demographic data could conceivably be used to reveal the identity
of the company—and thus the informants themselves—thus
compromising promised anonymity.
The interviews were part of a pilot study set up to probe how
a group of managers perceived IS and ISM issues in the company. The idea was to improve understanding of the “default”
IS/ISM situation, that is, a situation not characterized by any
major IS initiatives or drives. This would in turn help us see
certain needs that potential future initiatives could and perhaps
should be designed to address.
The methodological approach was guided by scientific realism (Pawson, 2007) in that we regard the responses from
our informants as—in principle—reflecting their behavior and
attitudes, as well as the relevant organizational and social circumstances. The rationale for working with this relatively small
number of informants from one company is that the case provides us with access to a number of key decision makers where
the intersection between leaders’ actions and understandings,
on the one hand, and the actual development of ways of working with IS, on the other, was sharply highlighted. In this effort,
we use the case to demonstrate our theoretical tracks and probe
their proposition. The methodological approach could thus not
be described as either exclusively deductive or inductive, but
as a form of abduction (e.g., Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2009).
Important to note is that the sample does not allow for statistical
generalization claims.
The (semistructured) interviews each lasted between 1 and
1.5 hours, and were organized around four central themes (the
b1–b2 designation reflects the fact that these two closely related
themes are analyzed under the same heading where we present
the findings):
a. Definitions and general understanding of IS and ISM by the
interviewees (the aim was to trawl for uncoached and as
far as possible decontextualized notions of what IS might
entail).

b1. Examples (if any) of initiatives taken to raise awareness
among employees (the question was designed to narrow the
discussion from abstract ideas or ideals (as answered in (a))
to on-the-ground measures in the company that they are
aware of, which they somehow consider IS-relevant.
b2. Experiences of positive and negative outcomes of various
measures (here the ISM process becomes the main focus).
c. Examples of learning related (in a wide sense) to IS and ISM
(we here probe for experiences of ISM-related processes:
what worked, what did not work).
Interviews were recorded and notes were taken during the
interviews.
The purpose of the interviews was to explore managers’ conception of ISM and how they worked with IS issues in the
context of this organization, with its structure and history. Based
on the studied literature and on preliminary interviews with a
manager responsible for security issues, and a senior advisor
on information management, we designed an interview guide.
The questions were open-ended to induce the managers to voice
their views and experiences in their own words. We particularly wanted to avoid asking questions that might suggest that
they ought to have done a number of things—creating an auditlike situation or a feeling that they were being interrogated.
The questions were meant to have a positive tone that encouraged managers to share their views and experiences as freely as
possible. Each interview began with questions about the interviewee’s general background and history in the company. It then
homed in on the four themes with open-ended questions such
as: “What comes to your mind when you hear the concept
‘information security’?” “Can you give any examples of specific
measures that the company has undertaken to improve ISM?”
“What effects, good or bad, did those measures create?” “We
have heard about measure X. How would you change X next
time, and why?”
The recordings were transcribed and merged with the notes
to provide an overview of what was said in relation to the four
themes. Each interview was analyzed in relation to the themes,
and the general “answer patterns” are reported in the following
section. A summary of the study (including an overview of the
findings) was presented and discussed in a seminar in which
four of the interviewees participated. Where required, details
and interpretations of data have been further corroborated by
means of follow-up correspondence with relevant interviewees.
DEFINITIONS OF IS AND ISM/MEANINGS OF ISM:
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
No Shared or Formal Definition of IS
The interviewees did not provide a coherent and shared definition of either information security or information security
management. The chief executive officer (CEO) knowledgeably discussed a wide variety of security-related issues, and
expanded on how the company as well as the sector at large
had historically worked with these issues and how they worked
with them now. Five of the remaining interviewees mentioned
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business-related information as something that had to be protected to some extent. All interviewees referred to the company’s “IT handbook” as a general source of information. It did
not appear to be an obviously “living” document, however, as
no interviewees provided pertinent details from it or presented
how they had used it.

IS Issues “Owned” by the IT Manager
The interviewees consistently referred to the company’s IT
manager as someone who knew about these things and who did
a very good job. The sales manager described how this worked
in the organization: “The IT manager has built a system that
works for our needs; he is out and about [talking to people]. . . .
He has a strategy and a way of thinking that help him explain
that we cannot have [certain software solutions] now but later;
we are well ahead [with a] system for authorization; [we] have
dealt with the virus risk; [he is] working proactively; I have
great confidence [in him]. . . . Previously you brought along
your laptop—now he has changed that so you access [systems]
through the laptop, you don’t have things in the laptop.”
As exemplified by the quotation, the interviewees were
very confident that the IT manager had a firm grasp of these
issues and that he had implemented proper technical procedures,
strategies and policies. This confidence was to a large extent
vindicated in the interview with the IT manager who clearly
had the most sophisticated views on IS and ISM among those
interviewed.

A Manager as an Island? Parochial Outlooks on IS
and ISM
While the CEO discussed almost all possible combinations
of security risks, the other informants tended to focus on issues
that were closely related to their own area of expertise and
responsibility. The senior manager responsible for sales discussed the possible risks of leaks from databases containing
customer information. He also perceived this as being related to
a more general tension between security and openness, where
efficient work processes have to build on openness and trust,
but where you restrict access to certain kinds of information
to a smaller group of employees—particularly during critical
negotiations with customers. Managers who were more directly
responsible for production tended to view security in terms of
reliability of production processes, and safety issues related to
the potential physical dangers involved in production processes.
The information manager focused on how the company dealt
with information and public relations (PR) issues, especially
as they related to who was authorized to speak on behalf of
the organization about various issues. For the security coordinator, the focus was associated with the challenges intrinsic to
working with a wide array of security issues—and spreading
awareness about them.
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Comments
The responsibility for—and knowledge of—IS and ISM has
been informally delegated to the IT manager. While the interviewees seemed content with this division of labor, there was
some evident embarrassment over what they perceived as their
difficulties in presenting a formal or more coherent definition
of information security and how they worked with information
security management in the company. Some of the interviewees
also expressed concerns about their being too naive in relation
to security issues. To some extent this notion would seem to
be corroborated by the fact that there were very few spontaneously offered examples of risks related to terrorism, sabotage,
and so on.
In the interviews, security was typically discussed in terms
of broad themes such as ethics and trust, and responses
seldom focused on technology or IS per se. The interviewees demonstrated thorough understanding of their respective
responsibilities, but these responsibilities evidently anchored
their responses to questions about IS by connecting it to something more familiar. The managers’ views on IS/ISM can
roughly be divided as follows. In part IS/ISM was gladly
delegated to the competent IT manager. In part it was considered a somewhat nebulous phenomenon that they approached
through concepts and understandings based on their own primary responsibilities—and thus in ways that radically differed
from others’ perceptions of it. As a managerial concern, IS/ISM
was slender, where descriptions—and possibly understanding—
reflected facets of one’s own work practices (rather than stemming from “big picture” analyses), and where narratives tended
to stray to examples of irregular behaviors or system malfunctions as perceived or experienced from this local perspective.

INFORMATION SECURITY INITIATIVES AND THEIR
CONSEQUENCES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
IT Unit: From Maintenance/Support to Developer
of Strategy
Since the turn of the century, the company has effected a
number of changes that have had wide-ranging repercussions
for both business and general security. As a consequence, the
way that the company uses ICT has changed considerably,
and the IT section has evolved from a “technical” department
focused on running and maintaining IT hardware, to one that
is guided by a clear strategy and that “owns” the systems and
related security issues.
Major changes included the separation of supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) functions from administrative
systems (where they had previously been integrated); the implementation of a unified login service; the establishing of procedures to integrate IT systems in subsidiary companies and new
acquisitions; national authority-compliant system documentation; a written policy for computer use and Internet access; and
the removal of all end-user computer administrator privileges.
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Certain measures are mostly oriented toward physical security
(e.g., locked doors between floors in office-buildings, and the
relocation of servers to secure areas.
Difficulties Related to Lack of Knowledge and Attitudes
The IT manager described how users make a substantial
investment of resources when they familiarize themselves with
existing systems, and how these sunk costs tend to make them
focus on specific “vital” (from their point of view) subprocedures when asked to evaluate potential replacements. He
emphasized that it is generally difficult for normal users to
free themselves from their own daily concerns to appreciate
wider structural implications—including how security may be
affected.
When users were stripped of their local computer administrator privileges, it led to a number of discussions with employees
who were upset that their freedom to install software as they saw
fit had been curtailed. Another issue mentioned in the interviews
was that too many passwords can be a nuisance and constitute
an unwanted and continual obstruction when going about daily
work life.
Management by Walking Around
In the interview with the IT manager (and further corroborated in the other interviews), it became clear that the
IT manager’s preferred mode of operation (MO) is continual, on-the-floor interaction with management teams, heads of
departments, and local IT reps. This includes regular meetings
where policies, strategies, and explanations (i.e., the practical
understanding of policies and strategies) are discussed. The IT
manager emphasized that—in addition to putting formal documents on the intranet—it is essential to understand the way in
which work with (policy) integration is actually dealt with on
the floor, if IT (and ISM) strategy is to be more than a dead
letter.
And that’s the reason I walk around talking [to people]: there is
no point writing books, or instructions or putting it on the intranet.
You have to do it like this, talk, stand up for your viewpoint and
explain. What we are also doing is . . . you sign . . . in order to [get
internet access], you have to sign . . . that I have read the IT manual,
that I have read it and that I will from now on keep my self up to
date with things. (IT manager)

Comments
The broad ICT measures adopted by the company have
impacted a variety of core business practices. In part, changes
have been brought about as a consequence of a proactive
strategy (sandboxing of SCADA systems, integration, server
solutions, fire walls, and so on). In other cases, measures have
been reactive: the result of incidents, such as computer thefts,
inappropriate use of the Internet, and so on.
From individual employees’ points of view, some of these
measures can be experienced as unwanted restrictions of their

autonomy. Stricter policies about acceptable software, administrator privileges, use of printers, and so on can in some cases be
difficult to understand and to accept. They can also be perceived
as illegitimate restrictions, not only of personal autonomy but
also of one’s professional discretion. This is where the IT manager’s emphasis on continual interaction and dialogue seems
particularly prudent. In instances where employees find it difficult to reconcile particular demands with their primary task
and/or the prevailing work ethos, written policies are unlikely
to suffice. A complementing strategy of interaction and dialogue
will be more successful when knowledge, norms, and attitudes
are to be altered.

EXAMPLES OF LEARNING RELATED TO IS AND ISM:
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Learning From Incidents
Reactions to different kinds of incidents and problems
that have occurred over the years, and the measures that
have been implemented as a consequence, constitute a distinct and interesting learning process. The interviewees gave
little indication that the company had a coherent, formalized
ISM policy, preferring to offer different examples of incidents and subsequent measures when asked about information
security.
An important event that all interviewees discussed was a natural disaster some years back that had had a profound impact on
the company and its customers. The event stretched contingency
plans beyond their limits, and exposed a number of organizational weaknesses. The realization that the company had been
ill prepared for problems on that scale led to a comprehensive
review of existing crisis management structures. The company
has since improved its ability to maintain operations and keep
customers and media up to speed even in highly abnormal
operating conditions.
The shared experience also had an impact on internal social
systems, however. The way employees had to marshal all
resources to overcome the difficulties improved the general
esprit de corps, and successful managers were provided with
a “halo” of recognition.

Comments
The event itself seems to have become a crucial part of
the company’s shared mythos, and a virtual litmus test when
crises and crisis management is discussed (“how would proposed measure X have worked in the experienced disaster,”
etc.). The informants tended to relate questions about “information security” to “risk,” and then to their experience during the
event—and what they had learned from it. Indeed, the event was
so pervasive a theme in the interviews that it seems warranted to
describe it as a formative experience with the continuing power
to form perceptions, thinking, and identities.
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TRACKING BACK: CONNECTING EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
TO THEORY
Macro Track—A Systems Outlook
For managers to be able to relate in a skilful way to the wider
systemic processes—and their relationship with the “space of
possibilities” surrounding individual employees—they have to
have access to mental representations of these systems, and be
able to share perspectives that can support a process of critical
inquiry. This is especially applicable when systemic processes
like practical drift (Snook, 2000) and migration toward boundaries (Rasmussen, 1997) are in operation. In order to deal with
phenomena of this kind, external mechanisms of social, economical, and technical nature have to be considered over time.
The last decade has seen the company go through a process of
transformation that has deeply affected its operations. ICTs have
become key aspects of the company’s production, distribution,
marketing, customer relations, and sales support systems. This
development has been relatively rapid, and ICT integration has
become gradually more sophisticated, as exemplified by the IT
manager’s work with the IT strategy. At the same time, interviewee responses to questions about information security management clearly indicate that the ICT strategy in general, and
ISM issues in particular, remain a separate domain. Discourses
on security generally revolve around production systems and
related safety and security issues. The interviewees demonstrate
a close familiarity with these production technologies and with
how the state’s role in infrastructure maintenance—and thus
general security awareness in this field—has changed over the
last 20 years. There are fewer signs that a shared perspective on
the strategic role of ICT and IS has manifested itself, however.
ICTs may have become pervasive throughout the organization,
but “problem ownership” and strategic identification of latent
threats have de facto remained exclusive IT manager concerns.
One tenable theoretical interpretation is that the company is
in fact still in the middle of a transformation process where
ICTs gradually evolve to become pivotal aspects of all production and business processes. McFadzean’s (2007) contention is
that such transformation will eventually lead to the upgrading
of ICT issues to the strategic planning level, which will in turn
engender more active consideration of IS issues.
A basic question in a study such as this one is how you
accelerate this process of maturation. While a high level of
technical IT security has been attained—in no small part a
testament to the IT manager’s competence—the ability of management as a whole to engage in critical reflection and debate
on how its members work with IS from a systems perspective (e.g., in the sense of Rasmussen’s notion of migration
toward boundaries and Snook’s practical drift) seems to be relatively stunted. The lack of system representations, suitable
metrics, and shared mental models makes these kinds of deliberation still harder. A critical consequence of such a state of
affairs is that a limited and/or deficient discourse on systemic
processes on the managerial level severely limits/undermines
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individual managers’ ability to work with learning processes
and lead/influence their coworkers truly to integrate these issues
in their work practices. There is consequently a risk that we
get fiefs of IS understanding that may hinder the IT manager’s
attempts to implement company-wide policies. In a rather more
nomadic organizational context—a future scenario worth serious consideration—such fiefs can become very small indeed.
We argue that in order for managers to be able to support
information security awareness and be better equipped to deal
both with risks and various interventions/security measures
they have to have shared understandings/mental models of how
ICTs work in the organization. This can in fact be regarded as
a basic requirement for ISM that is aligned with the organization’s structure, task, and strategy and that can be managed both
with flexibility and over the long term.
Meso Track—A Learning Process Outlook
The informants gave no examples of specific organizational
learning mechanisms in the form of evaluations, after-action
debriefings, and so on (as discussed by, e.g., Lipshitz et al.
[2002]). With the exception of the IT manager, nor did they refer
to any systematic gathering of IS and ISM data. Although these
views do not necessarily reflect the actual activities of the IT
department and the IT manager, they represent how the informants perceived how they worked with these issues. We found
no examples of managers being involved in ISM-related problem solving/knowledge creation, analysis, storing, and retrieval
in this more formal way.
When informants discussed their own area of expertise, on the
other hand, there were strong representations of primary tasks
(informants were happy to elaborate, were generally more animated, and provided far more details). The strong representations
clearly make them better able to establish goals, identify gaps
between goals and outcomes, formulate strategies, and generally
make sense of their situation. When asked to discuss IS and ISM,
informants primarily talked about high-impact, high-visibility
incidents (e.g., computer theft, system breakdowns, viruses, and
crises). This somewhat reactive learning orientation was evident
when the impact of the natural disaster was discussed. The event
engendered a most thorough review and documentation of the
lessons learned, and interviewees were quick to relate their takes
on IS to this process. This form of “flash learning” is not ubiquitous: Primary work tasks are embedded in a finely detailed
web of concepts and indicators, including but not limited to
the major events, that can be used as forward-looking planning
instruments as well as retrospective evaluation tools. (Perceived)
peripheral issues such as IS belong to a special category that will
get isolated flashes of retrospective attention when something
goes disastrously wrong. There is then a risk that single events—
and subsequent analysis—will come to dominate learning and
interpretation of related (in our case) IS risks.
Learning associated with IS and ISM lacks this elaboration,
and the informants’ approach to IS/ISM can best be described
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as a form of sense-making (Weick, 1995) where managers
extrapolate from something that is known and familiar in order
to make sense of the less charted terrain of ICT and IS/ISM.
The implication for management is that narratives that provide meaning and a rationale for new policies and routines,
and that connect to existing sense-making efforts in the organization, may be a crucial part in the early stages of creating
awareness, as evidenced in this case.
Micro Track—An Interpersonal Outlook
The most obvious example of direct interaction and influence processes in this study is the way that the IT manager goes
about his work. Most striking is his emphasis on the importance of continual interaction and relationship-building with
employees on all levels, and his experience-based assertion that
written policies alone will not resolve problems. This interpersonal style of influence—“management by walking around”—is
promoted by another interviewee who argues that the live personal encounter is particularly important in a geographically
dispersed organization where “management by mail does not
work,” as this interviewee tersely puts it.
The IT manager communicates the standards and norms as
laid down in formal policies and rules, and then prepares to
discuss and explain—at some length—why they make sense
from technological, strategic, and security viewpoints. Through
this process, both his fellow managers and other employees are
provided time and opportunity to become aware of their own
attitudes and, possibly, to adopt new ones. At the same time
they learn about standards, goals, and relevant norms in the
organization and develop their understanding of ICT in general and pertinent IS issues and the company’s overarching
take on ISM in particular. The opportunity for relaxed, informal dialogue enables employees to “manage themselves” and
to participate in a process where they can develop awareness of
risks and threats and learn how to deal with IS within their organizational role/task. It is this awareness and ability that can be
perceived as making up the critical “coping skills at boundaries”
that Rasmussen (1997, p. 191) refers to. An important point is
that in order for managers to be able to support development of
these skills in employees, they have to be guided by the kind of
systemic understanding discussed in the macro track.
This kind of leadership in connection with ICT and ISM is
seldom addressed in the literature, though there are exceptions.
Enns et al. (2003) discuss how IT managers should eschew sheer
pressure (which tends to generate resistance) and instead use
rational persuasion and personal appeal in order to influence
their peers more effectively. Albrechtsen and Hovden (2009)
even consider relationships between ISM officers and other
employees to be generally problematic and that this relational
breakdown may widen into a “digital divide,” separating users
and information security managers, and hardening radically different, indeed incompatible, perspectives, to the detriment of the
organization.

CONCLUSIONS
Linking Leadership to ISM: Advantages of the Three-Track
Approach
At the start of this enterprise we set out to identify and
discuss possible mechanisms by which managers may help
or hinder the development of ISM in an organization. When
exploring the mechanisms involved in how leadership influences awareness and implementation of ISM, we suggested that
these mechanisms can be fruitfully analysed using three complementary tracks: cognitive/behavioral (micro track); learning
and knowledge (meso track); and systems (macro track). The
pilot study would tentatively seem to vindicate this proposition:
It did not present much of a problem to anatomize the analysis
of our empirical data in the suggested way. The tracks should
prove helpful when analysts prepare to formulate hypotheses
and specific (survey or interview) questions to guide interventions and experiments. This is a step toward a more structured
theoretical understanding of how leadership can be linked by
awareness to vital aspects of IS and ISM. Ultimately, the benefits should trickle down to individual ISM stakeholders, who
get three very specific areas to analyze and strengthen in order
to improve actual (rather than formal) implementation of IS.
Without such a guiding structure, it is easy to mistake “success” in one of the tracks for generally successful management
of a complex issue area. A company may, for instance, have
adopted a number of measures that have duly resulted in overall
IS improvement. But if, on closer inspection, the measures all
reside on one of our three levels, that should mean that there
are still plenty of unexplored opportunities that management
perhaps never even contemplated. Conversely, a general feeling
that ISM is handled badly may well hide latent organizational
strengths (e.g., management failure may be confined to one of
the levels) to build on or complement.
An upgraded ability to identify more detailed strengths and
weaknesses will thus, perforce, aid anyone interested in improving information security. The suggested approach also situates
leadership and relates it to a number of well-known organizational practices (e.g., strategic planning; evaluation; various
forms of accounting; use of performance indicators; etc.) in
a way that acknowledges the inherently mediated character of
work in contemporary organizations. Since this reflects how
top-level actors in such organizations actually go about their
business, there is little rubbing against the grain: Suggested
strategic elements should not feel very alien, and should thus
be fairly easy to accommodate.
While the development and demonstration of the theoretical framework are the main focus of this article, the case itself
furnishes real-world insights how IS can be and, we suggest,
often is perceived by key decision makers in an organization
that adds to the stock of knowledge in this field. Albrechtsen
and Hovden (2009) identified what they referred to as a digital
divide between IS managers and users that could undermine the
efficacy of policies and ISM implementation. The results from
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the interviews in this study indicate that IS almost to a fault
seems to be the exclusive domain of the CIO/IT manager, and
that other managers mostly interpreted ICT and IS from their
own areas of responsibility, or related it to very general security concerns. Such a divide within a company’s management
team may have far-reaching consequences for awareness and the
quality of implementation efforts—particularly as we widen the
perspective to include more than primarily technical approaches
and checklists. As organizations become less tightly coupled
and more complex, traditional management-by-directive models become less feasible. We argue that our framework demonstrates why general (i.e., non-IT) managers must play an active
role vis-à-vis IS, and also, more specifically, how their actions
may affect employee awareness, attitudes, and behaviors in
ways that crucially facilitate implementation of ISM.
Generalizations from the demonstration case study should be
done with caution. The company was selected because it was
active in a business that was related to critical infrastructure and
could be expected to have a relatively sophisticated approach to
both safety and security issues. It was also profitable (meaning
that it could easily afford relevant measures), had a good safety
record, and was an active member in relevant national business
networks. We see no reason to believe that this company would
be any worse with respect to ISM than a typical enterprise, but
given that this is a single case study, we cannot back up such
a claim at this point. Ideally, this study should be followed by
large-scale surveys and experimental studies where the efficacy
of framework-derived interventions could be properly tested.
That said, a number of the general findings in this study echo
findings that have been reported in a number of other studies:
for example, that information security is rarely a top priority for
managers; that the interest in information security is contingent
on the role of ICT in the business the company is involved in
(McFadzean et al., 2007); that many employees have a limited
understanding of both IS risks and possible measures; that there
are often considerable gaps between IS specialists’ and general
managers’ understanding of IS (Albrechtsen & Hovden, 2009);
and that the focus is often on technical solutions rather than on
formal and informal measures (Sveen et al., 2009).

From Default Situation to IS Initiatives
Our study of an organization with a relatively under developed conceptualisation of IS throws light on what is probably
the default situation in many organizations, and improves our
understanding of the prevailing conditions before IS initiatives
are embarked upon. A somewhat surprising finding was that
IS was in fact a relatively alien concept to most informants
and that they were so quick to refer to (a) the IT manager’s
expertise, (b) their own background and experiences (from their
respective areas of expertise), and (c) the shared experience of
a major event (disaster) that had affected the company in a serious way. Similar circumstances pertain to many (if not most)
organizations where IS and ISM are generally perceived as
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relatively peripheral and alien issues, if not bothersome routines
and limitations of personal autonomy (Albrechtsen, 2007).
This indicates that an IS initiative needs to address aspects
of legitimacy, meaning, and sense-making to be successful.
Different individuals and groups within an organization will
typically make sense of IS based on their local area of expertise
and on shared formative experiences. To kick off proper change,
one would be well advised to connect to these specific sensemaking resources (Weick, 1995). The first step for leaders may
thus not be to “implement a policy” but to engage in preparatory
dialogues that make sense out of the general role of ICTs in the
organization, of IS, and of the possible benefits of ISM.
A notable recognition is that shared formative experiences,
such as disasters, may indeed reduce or remove opposition to
thorough review of fundamental work practices and thus prepare the ground for possibly radical organizational changes.
However, a sufficiently potent event may “freeze” the process
of making sense of events, and narratives, so that preparations
to meet a similar event blind the organization to future dangers
that do not fit the “benchmark catastrophe.”
Somewhat paradoxically, the status of IS as a (perceived)
marginal phenomenon may lead to learning processes of an
assimilative nature, characterized by sense-making either based
on familiar themes from work tasks or based on critical
incidents—in both cases focusing on legitimacy that may in fact
hamper implementation and true awareness.

Some Implications for the Practice of ISM
Ultimately the benefits of the analytical framework should
trickle down to individual ISM stakeholders, who get three very
specific areas to analyze and strengthen in order to improve
actual (rather than formal) implementation of IS. Some tentative advice to practitioners in the field based on the findings of
this study would be:
• Respect the fact that the various actors are unlikely
to have a sophisticated or coherent notion of what IS
actually is. Relate to experiences of well-known incidents and initially adapt accounts to fit the role of ICT
in operations, as perceived by the actor, and his or her
level of understanding of the issues. Early stages of IS
implementation may, for instance, to some extent have
to be introduced by a more general sharing of narratives and the subsequent gradual elaboration of more
sophisticated IS sense-making.
• If managers are expected truly to support IS, ISM, and
the development of information security awareness,
they have to be able to draw on a shared understanding
of ICT and IS and the macro (systemic) perspective,
that is, to understand ICT and IS in relation to overarching strategy, structure, employee behavior(s), attitudes, and knowledge, over time. These are the mental
models and understanding that we outlined in the
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macro track, and the learning mechanisms belonging
to the meso track.
• The next step is to have managers actively promote the
organization’s IS measures in their daily interaction
with subordinates. This is where a genuine familiarity
with IS matters and how they pertain to the organization
writ large (as well as the local subsetting) becomes so
important. If presentations of IS matters convey a sense
that IS is a separate and only intermittently revisited
concern, then that is basically what it will become.
• It is important to establish mechanisms that genuinely
support evaluation and systematic learning from ISrelated incidents. Since learning processes run the risk
of being undermined by a lack of competence and
interconnected defensive routines, this entails more
than organizing events or devising information material
where such matters are discussed. Ideal organizational
learning mechanisms will facilitate critical thinking
and constructive communication by being part of a
comprehensive “learning plan” plan where aspects on
all three levels (micro, meso, and macro) are considered.
• Technical measures, policies, and rules are important but have to be complemented by a level of
awareness that can be improved through recurring
interaction designed to change attitudes, norms, and
competences—for instance, by using goal-setting and
feedback loops.
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